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Non-technical Summary
Does Chinese trade competition pose a threat to labor and environmental standards in
other big developing countries such as India? Are standards in India and China pulled
down by standards in small countries such as Myanmar, Honduras or South Africa?
Does trade protectionism in the US protect standards in developing countries, or does it
undermine them?
These are questions of extraordinary and growing importance to poor countries in
a globalizing world. Yet one ¯nds very little in the way of analysis which speaks to them.
This is because the dominant perspective in present discussions is one of competition
between the rich North and the poor South, and the consequences of this for standards
in the North. Even the well worn phrase \race to the bottom" has typically come to be
seen in terms of downwards pressure on Northern standards as a result of competition
from the South. Not surprisingly, the dominant perspective has produced a large analyt-
ical literature. The perspective of South-South competition and its impact on Southern
standards has produced far less. The purpose of this paper is to develop a simple model
that can begin to provide insight into this perspective on the race to the bottom as seen
from the bottom, and to provide preliminary answers to the three questions posed above.
Consider a world in which large and small Southern countries export to the North.
Each Southern country has the choice of a high or a low standard. A high standard
conveys direct bene¯ts to workers, but has indirect costs through higher labor costs and
hence reduced output, exports and revenues. These bene¯ts and costs have to be bal-
anced against each other in the choice of higher or lower standards.
A key issue is the e®ect on the terms of trade { actual, or perceived. If small
exporters are individually too small to a®ect, or to perceive the e®ect on, terms of trade,
considerations of expanding market share are likely to dominate. Thus small exporters
will end up with lower standards. In contrast, each big exporter worries about terms of
trade e®ects of its own output choices, the output of its rivals, and hence their choice of
standards. We consider mutually consistent choice of standards in the strategic interac-
tion between big exporters and ask whether and when these standards are likely to be
high or low.
We ¯nd that among the big exporters, the bigger ones are more likely to end
up with the higher standards since they su®er bigger terms of trade losses as result of
adopting lower standards and thereby putting a large increase in output on the mar-
ket. Putting this together with the ¯nding that small exporters will always adopt the
low standard thus suggests a positive association between export market share and high
standards.
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The competition on standards between the big exporters is framed by the total size
of the \competitive fringe" of individually small exporters, and by the nature of Northern
demand, in particular by its price responsiveness. A key question concerns the incentives
to adopt high standards for a big exporter as a function of the output of those who have
low standards. When a big exporter adopts high standards, its output and exports are
reduced but its terms of trade improve. So the magnitude of the terms of trade improve-
ment as output falls is important. Is this improvement bigger when total output of all
exporters is bigger (as a result of low standards elsewhere), or is it smaller? The answer
depends on the precise shape of the Northern import demand curve. Depending on this
shape, standards across countries are either \complements" or \substitutes". When they
are complements adoption of high standards by some increases the incentives for others
to do the same. When they are substitutes, the opposite is the case. Complementarity
or substitutability is an empirical matter for each commodity in question and in princi-
ple one is as likely as the other. The analysis therefore has to be conducted for each case.
When standards are complements, a larger competitive fringe of small exporters is
more likely to produce lower standards in big exporters-the lower standards of the former
reduce the incentives for the latter to adopt high standards. When standards are sub-
stitutes, a larger competitive fringe is likely to produce higher standards in big exporters.
If the big exporters end up with a situation where one or both of them has low
standards, is it worthwhile coordinating to achieve high standards? The answer depends
intricately on their relative sizes and on the size of the competitive fringe. In general,
coordination is more likely to be desirable, and successful, the more equal are the big
exporters in their market share. With very unequal market share the biggest exporter
acts more and more like a monopolist and is unlikely to bene¯t from coordination. At the
same time, coordination is more likely to be desirable when the competitive fringe gets
smaller and standards are complements, or when the fringe gets bigger and standards
are substitutes.
Consider now what happens when the North imposes an import tari® and Southern
strategic interaction on standards takes place in the shadow of this tari®. With a given
tari®, the revenue gains from undercutting on standards to expand market share are
now lower than before. The incentives to undercut are reduced and the big exporters are
more likely to adopt high standards (the small exporters will always perceive expansion
of market share as their best policy, and hence will continue to choose low standards).
In this sense, Northern protection could support high standards among the big exporters
in the South. But this is only half the story. It supposes that the North does not in turn
react to the choice of standards in the South by adjusting tari®s { indeed, adjusting them
optimally in its own interest. If this is the case, and the hierarchy of decision making is
reversed, the North can and will adjust tari®s to undo any terms of trade gains to the
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South from adopting high standards, since the South's gain is mirrored by the North's
loss. The result of such adjustment is that the big Southern exporters' incentives to adopt
high standards are drastically reduced, and low standards outcomes are much more likely.
Let us return to the three questions posed at the outset. The answer to the ¯rst
question depends on the relative size of an \India" or a \China". The larger country will
tend to have higher standards but, in general, asymmetry in size makes coordination on
high standards more di±cult. The answer to the second question depends on the nature
of Northern demand. If the price responsiveness of Northern demand makes standards
complements, then low standards in small exporters do indeed exert a downward pull on
standards in large exporters. But the opposite is true if standards are substitutes { this
is an issue that can only be resolved empirically. Finally, the answer to the third question
depends on the hierarchy of decision-making on tari®s in the North and standards in the
South. In the more realistic scenario where Northern countries choose tari®s in their
own interest taking into account Southern choice of standards, Northern protectionism
undermines Southern standards.
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1 Introduction
Does Chinese trade competition pose a threat to labor and environmental standards in
other big developing countries such as India? Are standards in India and China pulled
down by standards in small countries such as Myanmar, Honduras or South Africa?
Does trade protectionism in the U.S. protect standards in developing countries, or does
it undermine them?
These are questions of extraordinary and growing importance to poor countries
in a globalizing world. Yet one ¯nds very little in the way of analysis which speaks to
them. This is because the dominant perspective in present discussions is one of trade
competition between the rich North and the poor South, and the consequences of this
for standards in the North:
\Labor unions and human rights activists in developed countries argue that
market access in the North should be conditioned on raising labor standards
in the South to prevent social dumping and a \race to the bottom" in wages
and bene¯ts. Trade sanctions imposed in response to violations of labor stan-
dards are sometimes referred to as a \social clause". Developing countries
tend to view such clauses as disguised protectionism and have fought vigor-
ously against initiatives by the United States and other developed countries
to give the WTO a role in the area of labor standards" (Kahn, 2000).
Thus even the well worn phrase \race to the bottom" has typically come to be
seen in terms of downward pressure on Northern standards as a result of competition
with the South. It should be clear that this dominant perspective cannot address the
questions posed above. Recently, therefore, some commentators have begun to call for
the shift of perspective that these questions demand { to a perspective which highlights
South-South competition for export market share and its impact on Southern standards.
\Consider the celebrated soccer ball industry .... The top ¯ve suppliers were
Pakistan, China, Indonesia, India and Thailand, which together supplied
96.9 percent of soccer balls imported by the United States. It is also worth
keeping in mind that the United States does not produce any soccer balls.
If any of these countries is banned from exporting to the United States, it is
highly unlikely that the demand will shift to another industrialized nation.
It will be some other developing country which picks up the slack.... [L]abor
standards are a great concern within the developing country. This concern is
1
combined with a fear that any action on this front by any one country will
cause a shift in production to some other developing country. Indians point
out that China's lack of democracy enables it to use forms of forced labor,
such as prison labor, that would not be feasible in India. China, on the other
hand, worries about India's greater poverty pushing wages down and sending
large numbers of children into forced labor" (Basu, 1999).
1Not surprisingly, the dominant perspective has produced a large analytical literature.
The perspective of South-South trade competition and its impact on Southern standards
has produced far less. There are isolated references in the literature to this perspective
on the race to the bottom, from the bottom. For example, Brown, Deardor® and Stern
(1996) discuss possible collusion among developing countries to raise standards. But
there is very little analysis of the problem. Indeed, in their recent review Rollo and
Winters (2000) note that \so far this argument has not ¯gured at all in the debate."
Once the focus is shifted to trade competition among developing countries, it is
no longer appropriate to treat them as an undi®erentiated homogeneous group. In par-
ticular, there are big and small exporters in any commodity category. Basu's (1999)
example of soccer balls shows exports to U.S. dominated by ¯ve \big" exporters. Similar
size distribution patterns are present in exports to all countries, and in several commod-
ity categories, as shown in Table 1. The sizeable shares of developing countries in major
export markets suggest that there are potential price consequences when standards im-
prove and output changes. In particular, Brown, Deardor® and Stern's (1996) suggestion
to developing countries to collude on labor standards is based precisely on the possible
terms of trade e®ects of collusion between such countries. However, while big exporters
compete against each other, they also compete against smaller exporters who could take
away market share. There have been dramatic instances of shifts of production { away
from Iran in carpets, and towards textiles in Bangladesh, for example { which highlight
1Some recent contributions on labor standards are Bhagwati (1996), Brown, Deardor® and Stern
(1996), Ehrenberg (1994), Kuruvilla (1996), OECD (1996), Krugman (1997), Mah (1997), Maskus
(1997), Bagwell and Staiger (1998), Srinivasan (1998), Brown (2000). See Nordstrom and Vaughan
(2000) for an excellent survey on the literature on environmental standards. Kanbur, Keen and Van
Wijnbergen (1995) and Wilson (1996) examine the possibility of a race to the bottom in environmental
regulations when capital is internationally mobile. Basu and Chau (2000) analyzes the race to the top
in environmental standards in the presence of green consumerism.
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the threat that the big exporters face. The thought which follows is that while big ex-
porters will worry about the terms of trade consequences of their choice of standards
and indeed about standards elsewhere, small ones will not. To extend Basu's (1999)
analogy, while the competition between an India and a China in exports of soccer balls
is important and needs to be analyzed, equally important is the interaction between this
competition and the competition which the India's and the China's as a group face from
the South Africa's and the Honduras' of the world.
One of the key features of the dominant perspective is the focus on the role of
Northern protectionism and whether or not it is justi¯ed in light of North-South com-
petition on standards. There is a ¯erce debate on whether requirements for higher
standards in the South, as a part of trade agreements, are disguised protectionism, and
whether Northern trade protection through tari®s is an appropriate response to a pre-
sumed downward pull on Northern standards. But the question which is not addressed
in the dominant perspective is whether Northern trade protectionism hurts or bene¯ts
Southern standards, when the countries of the South are competing against each other
in export markets. This is the third of the questions posed above, and on which there is
again very little analysis.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a simple model that can begin to provide
insight into this perspective on the race to the bottom as seen from the bottom, and to
provide preliminary answers to the three questions posed at the beginning. Section 2
sets out the elements of a model of Ricardian trade, in which \big" and \small" Southern
countries export into a Northern demand curve. Countries have the choice of adopting
a high or a low \standard", which we will think of as a labor standard but which could
equally be an environmental standard. The essential point is that there is an intervention
which could directly enhance welfare but which also raises labor costs and hence reduces
output and exports.
Section 3 explores the incentives that di®erent countries have to adopt the high
standard. Big exporters take into account the terms of trade e®ects, and standards in
other countries, while the \competitive fringe" of small exporters do not. Given these
incentives, Section 4 characterizes Nash equilibria in standards as a function of the
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Northern demand curve, the size of the big exports relative to each other, and the size
of the competitive fringe. It provides a precise and complete characterization of when
high standards and low standards equilibria arise as the parameters vary.
Section 5 turns to welfare and asks if and when there exists the possibility of welfare
improving coordination on high standards when the Nash equilibrium is a low standards
equilibrium. Section 6 considers the consequences of a Northern tari® for the outcome of
South-South competition on standards. In particular, it looks at whether the Northern
tari®s increases or decreases the likelihood of low standards equilibrium in the South. It
shows that the answer depends critically on the timing of whether the tari® is chosen
before the standards are set in the South, or after.
Section 7 concludes. It revisits the three questions that motivated this paper,
examines the answers which this paper provides, and suggests areas for further research.
2 The Model
We will develop the simplest trade model in which standards and competition among
exporting countries can be analyzed. Let there be two internationally traded commodi-
ties, indexed by j = 1; 2, and a single internationally immobile but domestically mobile
factor, labor. A single developed country imports good 1 from developing countries.
The developing countries can be divided into two types. The ¯rst group of countries,
labeled i = 0, is made up of many identical small open economies who take the world
price of their exports as given. Without loss of generality, we normalize the number of
these small countries to unity. The second group of exporters consists of two developing
economies labeled i = 1; 2. We will refer to them as large exporters, in the sense that
they take into account the terms of trade consequences of any changes in their exports.
The Northern importing country is denoted by ¤.
Each exporting country, large or small, has the choice of a level of domestic stan-
idard s , where
i ¡ + + ¡s = fs ; s g; s > s ; i = 0; 1; 2 (1)
+so that s denotes the higher standard. We think of this as a labor standard, but it
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icould equally well be interpreted as an environmental standard. Choice of standard s
a®ects production costs and the utility of workers in the country. Let us begin with the
production costs story. Production technologies in the exporting and importing countries
are assumed to be given by
iÁ(s )a x = L ; j = 1; 2; i = 0; 1; 2 (2)j j j
¤ ¤ ¤a x = L ; j = 1; 2 (3)j j j
where L denotes labor employed in sector j, x is the output of sector j , a thej j j
input-output coe±cient, and Á is a coe±cient showing the cost consequences of adopting
di®erent standards (we focus solely on standards in the exporting countries). We assume
¡ ¡ +s = 1; Á(s ) = 1; Á(s ) > 1: (4)
Thus we normalize the lower standard at unity, and normalize its e®ect on labor cost at
neutrality. The higher standard lowers output per worker in each sector.
With technology as described by (2) and (3), the production frontiers of the ex-
porting countries and the importing country are given by
i i i i iÁ(s )a x + Á(s )a x = L ; i = 0; 1; 21 21 2
¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤a x + a x = L ; (5)1 1 2 2
iwhere L denotes the labor endowment of country i. We assume that
¤a a11 > (6)¤a a22
so that developing countries have comparative advantage in production of good 1. Let
good 2 be the numeraire and let p be the world price of good 1 relative to good 2. It is
well known that if p lies in the range
¤a a11 > p > (7)¤a a22
then i = 0; 1; 2 will specialize in the production of good 1 and ¤ will specialize in the
production of good 2. We will focus on this range of outcomes. With this pattern of
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specialization revenue functions can be written as
ipLi iR (p; s ) = (8)
iÁ(s )a1
¤L¤R (p) = : (9)¤a2
The production costs of higher standards are thus re°ected in lower revenues as shown
+ ¡in (8), since Á(s ) > Á(s ) = 1.
The revenue losses associated with higher standards are to be set against the
potential utility gains. We characterize these e®ects through the following utility function
i i iU (c ; c ; s ) = ® log c + (1¡ ®) log c + log s ; i = 0; 1; 2 (10)1 2 1 2
i ¡where c and c represent consumption of the two commodities. Thus when s = s = 1,1 2
i +we have the base case of no e®ect on utility. But the higher standard s = s > 1 raises
utility directly. This utility function is of course restrictive. For example, it implies that
the marginal rate of substitution in consumption between c and c is independent of1 2
the standard. But, as will be seen, the special form used in (10) serves to simplify the
2analytics and to provide sharp characterizations of equilibria.
For exporting countries, maximizing (10) subject to the revenue constraint in (8)
gives the following indirect utility function
i is Li iV (p; s ) = K + log + (1¡ ®) log p; i = 0; 1; 2 (11)
iÁ(s )a1
where K = ® log®+ (1¡ ®) log(1¡ ®) is a constant in the analysis. The export supply
functions are given by
iLiX = (1¡ ®) ; i = 0; 1; 2 (12)1 iÁ(s )a1
+Notice from (12) that exports fall with the adoption of high standards, since Á(s ) > 1.
For the importing country, denote utility, indirect utility and the inverse import demand
function by
¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤U = U (c ; c ); V = V (p;R ); p = p (c ; R ): (13)1 2 1
2Without a doubt, standards are multifaceted (Fields, 2000). Brown, Deardor® and Stern (1996)
points out that most labor standards are labor using, and e®ectively reduce the labor endowment of the
country imposing the standard. In our model, these production e®ects of higher standards are subsumed
iunder the term Á(s ).
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In what follows we drop the subscript representing commodity 1, it being understood
that the focus is on exports and imports of j = 1. We also drop the superscript ¤
¤from p (¢), it being understood that p(¢) represents the inverse Northern import demand
function for good 1.
From (12) it is clear that total exports depend critically on how many workers in
the developing world fall under a high standards regime. Denote by ` the number of
+workers in all the exporting countries that have s = s . Also, de¯ne
1 2L = L + L (14)
as the labor endowment of the two big exporting countries. Then total exports can be
written as
X
iX (`) = X1 1
i=0;1;2 " #
1¡ ® 10= L + L¡ `(1¡ ) (15)
+a Á(s )1
World trade equilibrium is given by a market clearing relative price p, such that
p = p(X(`)) (16)
¤where we have suppressed the dependence of p on R . Notice thatÃ !
@X 1¡ ® 1
= ¡ 1¡ < 0: (17)
+@` a Á(s )1
+since Á(s ) > 1. As more and more workers came under the high standards regime,
production costs rise and output falls, as do exports. We assume that p(¢) is downward
sloping. Hence
@p @p @X
= > 0 (18)
@` @X @`
in other words, higher standards lead to an improvement in the terms of trade for ex-
porters.
We can thus characterize world trade equilibrium when ` of the workers in the
developing world come under the high standards regime. But what determines `? The
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next section considers the incentives for each country to adopt or not adopt the high
standard, and provides a precise characterization of the patterns of incentives as country
size and import demand varies.
3 Incentives for Adopting Standards
i i +We assume that country i adopts the higher standard if its welfare V with s = s ,
i+ i ¡ i¡denoted V , is greater than welfare with s = s = 1, denoted V . Let the number
¡iof workers other than those of country i who have the higher standard be ` . Then
¡i ¡i icountry i's adoption of the higher standard increases ` from ` to ` + L . From (11),
the gain in welfare from adopting the high standard is
i ¡i ¡i i i+ i¡¢ (` ; ` + L ) = V ¡ V
+ hs ¡i i= log + (1¡ ®) log p(X(` + L ))
+Á(s ) i¡i¡ log p(X(` )) ; i = 0; 1; 2 (19)
¡i i ¡iwhere p(X(` + L )) and p(X(` )) are the equilibrium terms of trade from (16), as
di®erent numbers of workers come under the higher standard.
Expression (19) captures the di®erent forces acting on welfare. First is the direct
+ +e®ect on welfare through s . Second is the production cost e®ect through Á(s ). Third,
there is the terms of trade e®ect
¡i i ¡ilog p(X(` + L ))¡ log p(X(` )):
Since p is increasing in ` from (18), the terms of trade e®ect is always positive. It follows
+that if the direct utility e®ect of the standard s is bigger than the production cost e®ect
+Á(s ), it is always worthwhile adopting the higher standard. In this case all countries
+would choose s = s and there would be nothing left to analyze on choice of standard.
To focus attention on the problems we are interested in, therefore, we assume
Assumption 1
+s
log < 0: (20)
+Á(s )
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Thus the production cost e®ect has to be traded o® against direct gains in utility and
terms of trade gains.
The assumption in (20) immediately determines the outcome in our model for
\small" exporters { in other words, those who take the terms of trade as given. For
¡0 0 ¡0these countries p(` + L ) is perceived to be the same as p(` ), so from (19) and (20)
0¢ < 0 (21)
and we have our ¯rst proposition.
Proposition 1 Small exporters always adopt the lower standard.
For small exporters, expanding market share improves welfare, so they always stick to
the lower standard. As we shall see, the relative weight of small exporters in overall
exports critically a®ects, in turn, the choice of standard in the big exporting countries.
We assume that the big exporting countries, i = 1; 2, fully perceive and take
into account the terms of trade e®ect in evaluating the gains from adopting the higher
¡i ¡i istandard. From (19), this gain depends on ` and ` + L . A central issue is whether
i ¡i¢ increases or decreases with ` , the number of workers in other countries who are
already under the high standard. To this end, we propose the following de¯nition:
De¯nition 1 Standards are complements (substitutes) if the net gain to a country from
adopting the high standard increases (decreases) with the number of workers in other
countries who are already under the high standard.
Complementarity or substitutability of standards, as de¯ned above, will prove a
3crucial determinant of incentives and of equilibrium outcomes. Since X is linear and
¡idecreasing in ` , ( )
i ¡i ¡i i@¢ (` ; ` + L ) > convex
0 according as log p(X) is : (22)¡i < concave@`
(22) immediately gives us the following proposition.
3The discussion here is closely related to that of strategic complementarity and substitutability as in
Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985).
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Proposition 2 Standards are complements (substitutes) if and only if the inverse import
demand function is logconvex (logconcave).
Logconcavity and logconvexity of the demand function can be related to standard de-
mand functions as follows:
Lemma 1 1. If p(X) is a constant elasticity function, it is logconvex.
2. If p(X) is linear, it is logconcave.
The proof of this lemma is straightforward, but what it shows is that two commonly
used demand functions give diametrically opposite answers to whether standards are
complements or substitutes and thus, as we shall see in the next section, lead to very
di®erent equilibrium outcomes in patterns of standards.
Having delineated when gains from high standards increase or decrease with other
adoptions of high standards, we are now in a position to characterize incentives in each
of the two large exporting countries to adopt the high standard, conditional on the other
country having, or not having, done so. We will be particularly interested in how their
1 2relative size a®ects these incentives. To this end, recall from (14) that L = L + L is
the total labor endowment of the big exporters, and de¯ne
L L1 2L = + ±; L = ¡ ±: (23)
2 2
Thus as ± varies between (¡L=2; L=2) it measures the size of country 1 relative to that
of country 2.
First of all, consider the gain for country 1 of adopting the high standard when
1country 2 has not done so. We denote this by ¢ where the superscript refers to the¡
country in question and the subscript denotes the level of standard in the other country
(¡ or +). Since from Proposition 1 the small exporters never adopt the high standard,
L¡1 ¡1 1 1in this case, ` = 0 and ` + L = L = + ±. From the de¯nition of total exports
2
X(`) in (15) we have
1¡ ®¡1 0X(` ) = X(0) = (L + L)
a1 " #
1¡ ® L 1¡1 1 1 0X(` + L ) = X(L ) = L + L¡ ( + ±)(1¡ ) :
+a 2 Á(s )1
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Thus from (19)
L1 1¢ = ¢ (0; + ±)¡ 2 · ¸+s L
= log + (1¡ ®) log p(X( + ±))¡ log p(X(0)) : (24)
+Á(s ) 2
Now consider the gain for country 1 from adopting the high standard when country 2
L1 ¡1 2 ¡1 1has already done so. Denote this ¢ . In this case ` = L = ¡ ±; and ` + L =+ 2
2 1L + L = L, " #
1¡ ® L 1¡1 2 0X(` ) = X(L ) = L + L¡ ( ¡ ±)(1¡ ) ;
+a 2 Á(s1 " #
1¡ ® 1¡1 1 0X(` + L ) = X(L) = L + L¡ L(1¡ ) :
+a Á(s )1
So from (19),
L1 1¢ = ¢ ( ¡ ±; L)+ 2 · ¸+s L
= log + (1¡ ®) log p(X(L))¡ log p(X( ¡ ±)) : (25)
+Á(s ) 2
By similar reasoning we can derive the gains for country 2 from adopting higher standards
2when country 1 has not done so, denoted ¢ and when country 1 has already done so,+
2denoted ¢ :¡
L2 2¢ = ¢ (0; ¡ ±)+ 2 · ¸+s L
= log + (1¡ ®) log p(X(L)¡ log p(X( ¡ ±)) (26)
+Á(s ) 2
L2 2¢ = ¢ ( + ±; L)¡ 2 · ¸+s L
= log + (1¡ ®) log p(X(L))¡ log p(X( + ±)) : (27)
+Á(s ) 2
Consider how the gains from adopting higher standards vary with two key param-
0eters { L , the weight of small exporters as a group, and ±, which captures the size of the
4 0two big exporters relative to each other. Inspection of (24) shows that as L increases
4 0The basic thrust of the propositions of this paper is unaltered if we consider not L but the share
0 0 1 2L =(L + L + L ).
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1¢ increases or decreases according as p(X) is logconvex or logconcave. In fact, inspec-¡
1 2 2tion of (25), (26) and (27) shows that the same is true for ¢ , ¢ and ¢ . This leads+ + ¡
to our next proposition.
Proposition 3 As the weight of small exporters increases, the gain to the large exporters
from adopting high standards increases if the inverse demand function is logconcave and
decreases if it is logconvex.
0The intuition behind this follows from Proposition 2. An increase in L increases the
number of workers falling under the low standards regime. If standards are complements
(p(¢) is logconvex) this will reduce incentives for others to adopt high standards. If on
the other hand standards are substitutes (p(¢) is logconcave), lower standards elsewhere
will increase the incentive for the big exporters as a group to adopt high standards.
0Let us turn to variations in ± for ¯xed L . Inspection of (24) shows that, since
+ 1Á(s ) > 1 and p(¢) is a decreasing function, ¢ is increasing in ±. The intuition is¡
as follows. With country 2 ¯xed at the low standard, when country 1 adopts the low
standard the total number of workers in the low standard regime is zero, independent
of ±. But when country 1 adopts the high standard the number of workers in the low
standard regime is reduced by (L=2 + ±). This reduction is greater, output is lower, and
price and welfare is higher, the bigger is ±. Hence the gains from country 1 adopting the
higher standard are increasing in ±. Similar reasoning, or direct inspection of (25), (26)
1 2 2and (27), shows that ¢ is increasing in ± and ¢ and ¢ are decreasing in ±. These+ + ¡
are all captured in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 As the relative size of a big exporter grows, its gain from adopting the
higher standard increases.
Propositions 3 and 4 characterize when the gains from adopting a high standard
0increase or decrease as L and ± vary parametrically. But actual adoption or otherwise
0depends on whether the gains are positive or negative. To partition the (±; L ) space
into regions where the high standard yields positive or negative bene¯ts, we need the
12
following four loci:
1 1 0¢ = 0 , ± = ± (L ) (28)¡ ¡
1 1 0¢ = 0 , ± = ± (L ) (29)+ +
2 2 0¢ = 0 , ± = ± (L ) (30)¡ ¡
2 2 0¢ = 0 , ± = ± (L ) (31)+ +
0Proposition 3 suggests strongly that any partitioning of (±; L ) space will depend crucially
on whether the inverse import demand curve is logconvex or logconcave. Let us develop
the partitioning ¯rst of all for the case of logconvexity, that is, complementarity of
1 0 0standards. It follows immediately that the locus ± (L ) is upward sloping in (±; L )¡
1 1space, and that below this locus ¢ > 0 and above it ¢ < 0, as shown in Figure 1.¡ ¡
To see the reasoning behind the partition shown there, start from a point on the locus,
1 1so that ¢ = 0. Then from Proposition 4 increasing ± makes ¢ > 0 and decreasing¡ ¡
1it makes ¢ < 0. And from Proposition 3, starting form a point on the locus and¡
0 1 0 1increasing L makes ¢ < 0 and decreasing L makes ¢ > 0, given the assumption of¡ ¡
complementarity (logconvexity of the demand function). It is then also easy to see that
1 0± (L ) must be upward sloping, as shown.¡
Figure 2 adds a partitioning into positive or negative gains for country 1 when
country 2 has already adopted the higher standard, still under complementarity. By the
1 0same reasoning as before, using Propositions 3 and 4, the locus ± (L ) is also upward+
1 0sloping. But it must also lie above ± (L ), except when ± = L=2 as shown in Figure 3.¡
1 0 1To see this, start from any point on the ± (L ) locus, so that ¢ in (24) is zero. We¡ ¡
1show that at this point ¢ in (25) must be positive for ± < L=2 because by adding the+
amount
L 1¡( ¡ ±)( ¡ 1)
+2 Á(s )
to each of the terms
L 10L + L¡ ( + ±)(1¡ )
+2 Á(s )
and
0L + L
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in expression (24) converts it to expression (25). But by logconvexity of p(¢) it follows
1that if (24) is zero, (25) must be positive for ± < L=2. Now if ± = L=2, ¢ (L=2¡ ±; L) =
1 1 1 0 1 0¢ (0; L) = ¢ (0; L=2 + ±). Thus, the ± (L ) locus and ± (L ) locus coincide exactly¡ +
at ± = L=2. Intuitively, there is just one large country when ± = L=2, and country
2's decision to adopt high or low standard has no impact on the net bene¯ts of high
standards to country i.
0Thus with complementarity Figure 2 gives the exact partitioning of (±; L ) space
into regions where country 1's gains from adopting high standards are positive or neg-
0ative. It is seen that with L low enough and ± large enough, country 1 bene¯ts from
0adopting high standards no matter what country 2 does. With L high enough and ±
small enough, country 1 loses from the high standard no matter what country 2 does. In
between these extremes, whether country 1 gains or loses from high standards depends
on what country 2 does.
2 0By reasoning similar to that which led to Figure 2, Figure 3 plots the loci ± (L )¡
2 0 2 0 2 0and ± (L ). It can be shown that ± (L ) and ± (L ) are downward sloping and that+ ¡ +
2 0 2 0± (L ) strictly lies above ± (L ) for ± > ¡L=2 under complementarity. In addition,+ ¡
2 0 2 0± (L ) and ± (L ) coincides at ± = ¡L=2. Finally, Figures 2 and 3 can be overlaid+ ¡
to give Figure 4 which provides a complete account of the gains and losses for the two
countries from adopting high standards under complementarity. As can be seen even our
very simple model leads to a complex pattern of incentives for each country, conditional
on the behavior of the other country.
The patterns may be complex, but they have an intuitive explanation based on the
reasoning leading up to Figure 4. Consider ¯rst of all regions A, B, and C at the top of
0the Figure, where L is \large". In these regions the predominant thrust of the incentives
is in favor of the low standard, either because both countries lose from the high standard
no matter what the other country does (region A), or because one country loses from the
high standard no matter what the other country does and the other country loses from
the high standard if the ¯rst country has a low standard (regions B and C). By similar
0and symmetric reasoning, in regions D, E and F, where L is \small", the thrust of the
incentives is in favor of the high standard.
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In regions G and H, the incentives are dramatically opposite for the two countries
depending on size. When country 1 is large enough, in region H, it has the incentive to
adopt high standards no matter what country 2 does, while country 2 has the incentive
to adopt low standards irrespective of what country 1 does. The situation is reversed
in region G, where country 2 is the relatively large one. Regions G and H illustrate
Proposition 4 further { relative largeness helps incentives for high standards for a big
exporter. This leaves region I, where neither of the two big exporters is very large relative
to the other, and the \small exporters" group is neither very large nor very small. In
this intermediate region, incentives for either country to adopt the high standard are
only positive if the country also adopts the high standard { otherwise the incentive is
negative.
All of the above discussion is for the case of complementarity, or logconvexity of
the inverse import demand function. How is the partitioning a®ected when standards are
substitutes and the demand function is logconcave? The answer is that the reasoning
is modi¯ed at several crucial steps, leading to a very di®erent type of partitioning of
0 1 0(±; L ) space. To illustrate this, consider what the locus ± (L ) would look like under¡
1 0substitutability. This is shown in Figure 5, which graphs ± (L ) as a downward sloping¡
1 1curve such that above the curve ¢ > 0 and below it ¢ < 0. To see this, start from a¡ ¡
1 0point on this locus, where by de¯nition ¢ = 0, and increase L while holding ± constant.¡
1From Proposition 3, ¢ > 0 under logconcavity. Since standards are now substitutes,¡
having more workers elsewhere with lower standards increases the bene¯t to country 1
from adopting the higher standard. Also, Proposition 4 tells us that increasing ± from
1 1 0the locus will make ¢ > 0. These two features together establish that the locus ± (L )¡ ¡
is downward sloping.
1 0 0With country 2 having the high standard, ± (L ) partitions the (±; L ) space into+
regions of positive or negative gains for country 1. Reasoning similar to that used for
1 0Figure 2, but this time using logconcavity, establishes that ± (L ) is downward slopping+
1 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0and lies above ± (L ), and ± (L ) lies above ± (L ). ± (L ) and ± L characterize the¡ ¡ + ¡ +
incentive patterns for country 2 under the assumption of substitutability of standards
analogously to Figure 3, and complete the characterization of incentives under substi-
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tutability for the two large countries.
Figure 5 presents some striking contrasts to Figure 4. In region A of Figure 5,
0where L is high enough, the incentives are all skewed in favor of the high standard.
This contrasts with the corresponding region A in Figure 4, where with high enough
0L the incentives are all in favor of the low standard. A similar reversal is seen in
comparing regions D in the two ¯gures. This diametrically opposite outcome is one of
the most striking consequences of the assumption of logconcavity or logconvexity of the
demand curve.
With complementarity, in Figure 4, regions B and C presented a congruent thrust
of incentives in favor of high standards, in the sense that while one country had positive
gains from the high standard no matter what, the other country had positive gains from
the high standard only if the ¯rst country had high standards. But regions B and C in
Figure 8 do not present such congruence. In region C, for example, country 1 had positive
gains from adopting the high standard no matter what country 2 does, but country 2
has positive gains from the high standard only if country 1 adopts the low standard. A
similar incongruence is found in region B and in regions E and F in Figure 5, in contrast
to the congruence in incentives in these regions in Figure 4.
Regions G and H are the two regions where incentive patterns are similar in the
two ¯gures. One country has the clear incentive to adopt the high standard, while the
other country has the clear incentive to adopt the low standard in these regions, in both
¯gures. But the intermediate region I in Figure 5 again presents a contrast with the
corresponding region in Figure 4. In Figure 4, each country has the incentive to adopt
the high standard if and only if the other country also adopts the high standard. However,
in Figure 5, each country has the incentive to adopt the high standard if and only if the
other country adopts the low standard. As might be guessed, these incentive patterns
have major consequences for what patterns of standards emerge as an equilibrium under
strategic interaction.
We have shown that the incentives for adoption of high standards depend intricately
not only on the nature of the import demand function, but also on the size structure
of exporting countries { the number of \small" exporters who take price as given, and
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the relative sizes of the \large" exporters, who take into account the terms of trade
consequences of their action. We are now ready to apply these results to an analysis of
strategic interaction and equilibrium in the choice of standards.
4 Equilibrium
Consider therefore the following simultaneous decision problem of the two large countries.
i iLet (q ; 1¡ q ) denote the mixed strategy in which country i adopts high standard with
i iprobability q , and low standard with the complementary probability 1¡q . The expected
welfare of country i, i = 1; 2 is given by:h i
i i j i j i+ j i+ iEV (q ; q ) = q q V (p(X(L))) + (1¡ q )V (p(X(L )))h i
i j i¡ j j i¡+(1¡ q ) q V (p(X(L ))) + (1¡ q )V (p(X(0))) ; i6= j: (32)
where E is the expectation operator. Making use of (24) - (27), (32) simpli¯es to³ ´
i i j i j i j iEV (q ; q ) = q q ¢ + (1¡ q )¢+ ¡h i
j i¡ j j i¡+ q V (p(X(L ))) + (1¡ q )V (p(X(0))) : (33)
i iDi®erentiating EV with respect to q , we have
i j i j iEV = q ¢ + (1¡ q )¢ i6= j; i = 1; 2: (34)iq + ¡
The sign of (34) thus depends crucially on combinations of
> >i i¢ 0 and ¢ 0; i = 1; 2:+ ¡< <
Some combinations can be ruled out given the structure of the problem. Thus
complementarity rules out
i i¢ < 0 and ¢ > 0; i = 1; 2:+ ¡
since it requires that the gains from adopting the high standard be greater when the other
country has already adopted the high standard. By analogous reasoning, substitutability
rules out
i i¢ > 0 and ¢ < 0; i = 1; 2:+ ¡
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Let us start with the complementarity case. Table 2 sets out all nine possible sign
patterns in this case. The cell labels A - I correspond exactly to regions A - I of Figure
4. In the cells are entries (+;+), (+;¡) (¡;+) and (¡;¡). These depict the Nash
equilibrium outcomes. The ¯rst entry is for country 1, the second for country 2. A +
depicts high standard, and ¡ a low standard.
Table 3 provides a complete characterization of stable Nash equilibria. The rea-
i i isoning is as follows. Whenever ¢ > 0 and ¢ > 0, then q = 1 from (34), and the high+ ¡
standard is the dominant strategy. This is why the ¯rst entries in the cells of the ¯rst row
of Table 1 are all +, and the second entries in the cells of the ¯rst column are also +. By
i ianalogous reasoning, whenever ¢ < 0, and ¢ < 0, then low standard is the dominant+ ¡
strategy. Putting these together we get that (¡;¡) is the unique Nash equilibrium for
cell A (and therefore region A of Figure 4), while (+,+) is the corresponding equilibrium
for cell D.
If the combination of sign patterns is
i i¢ > 0 and ¢ > 0+ ¡
j j¢ < 0 and ¢ < 0; i6= j+ ¡
that is, a pattern of \opposing dominant strategies", then clearly we will get an equilib-
rium with
i jq = 1 = 1¡ q ; i6= j:
Hence the asymmetric sign patterns in cells G and H. But if the sign patterns are
i i¢ > 0 and ¢ > 0+ ¡
j j¢ > 0 and ¢ < 0; i6= j:+ ¡
i jthen from (34) q = 1 and, considering (34) with i and j switched around, q = 1. Hence
in this case both countries will end up with high standards, as shown in cells E and F .
By similar reasoning if
i i¢ < 0 and ¢ > 0+ ¡
j j¢ > 0 and ¢ > 0; i6= j:+ ¡
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i jthen q = q = 0, as shown in cells B and C.
This leaves the sign pattern in cell I:
i i¢ > 0 and ¢ < 0; i = 1; 2:+ ¡
jFrom (34), by standard arguments there exists a unique ~q , such that
i j i j iEV = ~q ¢ + (1¡ ~q )¢ = 0:iq + ¡
i jIn addition, by complementarity, EV is monotonically increasing in q sinceiq
i i iEV = ¢ ¡¢ > 0: (35)i jq q + ¡
j j i i jThus, for all q > ~q , EV > 0. The best-response function of country i, q (q ) is giveniq
by: 8
j j> 0 if q < ~q ;<
i j j jq (q ) = [0; 1] if q = ~q (36)>: 1 otherwise.
By standard arguments, there are three possible equilibrium outcomes, respectively in-
volving: (i) low standards in both countries, (ii) high standards in both countries, and
(iii) a mixed strategy equilibrium with
j¡¢¡i~q = ; i = 1; 2; i6= j; (37)j j¢ ¡¢+ ¡
It is easy to show that this mixed strategy equilibrium is unstable via the standard
adjustment process. We therefore show only the two pure strategy equilibrium in cell I
of Table 1.
0Figure 6 translates Table 2 back on to (±; L ) space. It shows the pattern of Nash
equilibria across di®erent regions A¡I, which correspond exactly to the regions in Figure
4 and the cells in Table 2. There are ¯ve possible equilibrium con¯gurations of stan-
0 0dards, depending on ± and L . In particular, when L is su±ciently small (region D),
both countries bene¯t from adopting high standards, depicted (+;+). Another symmet-
ric outcome indicates just the opposite scenario, with (¡;¡) when the market share of
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big exporters is su±ciently small relative to small countries (region A). Finally, asymme-
tries in labor endowments in the two large countries likewise imply asymmetries in the
i jequilibrium strategies, with q = 1 ¡ q = 1 whenever country i possesses signi¯cantly
more market power than country j (regions G and H), depicted (¡;+) and (+;¡).
When export competition with the group of small countries with low standard is
0not too intense (L is su±ciently small), regions E and F admit the symmetric Nash
equilibrium (+;+), even though the high standard is a dominant strategy for only one of
the two countries. The intuition follows from strategic complementarity, as high standard
jin country i raises the bene¯ts of high standard in j enough to justify setting q = 1.
Similarly, as soon as export competition comes increasingly from countries with low
standards, regions B and C admit yet another symmetric Nash equilibrium (¡;¡), even
though low standard is a dominant strategy for only one of the two countries. Finally,
0in region I, where L and ± are of intermediate magnitude, there are two pure strategy
equilibria wherein both of the above symmetric Nash equilibrium are possible.
We turn now to the case where standards are substitutes. Table 3 lays out the
i ipatterns of ¢ , ¢ , the cells of the Table corresponding exactly to the regions in Figure+ ¡
5. As in the discussion of the complementarity case, when
i i¢ > 0 and ¢ > 0; i = 1; 2+ ¡
i i¢ < 0 and ¢ < 0; i = 1; 2:+ ¡
we get a dominant strategy equilibrium and the outcomes (+;+) and (¡;¡) respectively
as shown in cells A and D. When there are opposing dominant strategies
i i¢ > 0 and ¢ > 0+ ¡
j j¢ < 0 and ¢ < 0; i6= j+ ¡
then as before we get asymmetric Nash equilibria (+;¡) and (¡;+) as shown in cells G
and H.
When only one of the countries has a dominant strategy:
i i¢ > 0 and ¢ > 0+ ¡
j j¢ > 0 and ¢ < 0; i6= j:+ ¡
20
i ithen from (34) q = 1. Switiching i and j in (34), and setting q = 1 gives us, since
j j¢ < 0, q = 0. Thus in cells B and C, we get (¡;+) and (+;¡) as the outcomes.+
Similarly, when
i i¢ < 0 and ¢ < 0+ ¡
i i¢ < 0 and ¢ > 0; i6= j:+ ¡
we get the asymmetric equilibria (+;¡) and (¡;+) in cells F and E.
Finally, consider cell I, with sign pattern
i i¢ < 0 and ¢ > 0; i = 1; 2:+ ¡
jIn this case, there exists a unique ~q such that
i j i j iEV = ~q ¢ + (1¡ ~q )¢ = 0:iq + ¡
Also, by substitutability,
i i iEV = ¢ ¡¢ < 0: (38)i jq q + ¡
j j i i jThus, for all q > ~q , EV < 0. The best-response function of country i, q (q ) is giveniq
by: 8
j j> 0 if q > ~q ;<
i j j j[0; 1] if q = ~qq (q ) = (39)>: 1 otherwise.
i j 1Note that since q (q ) is downward sloping, there are three Nash equilibria, with q =
2 2 1 1 1 2 21 = 1¡q , q = 1 = 1¡ q , and q = ~q and q = ~q . But the mixed strategy equilibrium
i j i j(~q ; ~q ) is unstable, with ~q and ~q given by (37). So we show only the (+;¡) and (¡;+)
pure strategy equilibria in cell I of Table 3.
0Figure 7 translates Table 3 into (±; L ) space for the substitutability case, with
regions A ¡ I in Figure 7 corresponding exactly to cells A ¡ I in Table 2 and regions
0A¡ I in Figure 5. Starting from (±; L ) combinations such that ± neither too large, nor
too small, note that by substitutability, the symmetric Nash equilibrium (+;+) applies
0 0for (±; L ) combinations in region A of Figure 7, when L is large enough. However,
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0(¡;¡) applies in region D only, when L is su±ciently small. Region I admits two
asymmetric Nash equilibria. Thus, contrary to the case of strategic complementarity,
export competition from small countries with low standards in fact prompts both coun-
tries to adopt high standards. As such, under substitutability there is no presumption
that export competition induces a race to the bottom in standards as competition arises
from countries with low standards.
0In contrast, combinations of (±; L ) in region G (H) are the circumstances under
which the market power country 1 (2) is large enough relative to country 2 (1), so that the
1 2dominant strategy of the two countries are diametrically opposed, with q = 1 = 1¡ q
2 1(q = 1 = 1 ¡ q ), shown as (+;¡) (or (¡;+)). Note also that strategic interactions
between the two countries yield asymmetric Nash equilibria even when one of the two
countries does not have dominant strategy. In particular, in regions F and C where ± is
1 2relatively large, q = 1 and q = 0, shown as (+;¡). The intuition follows from strategic
substitutability, as high standard in country 1 is su±cient to deter country 2 from raising
1 2standard. Regions E and F depicts the opposite scenario, and q = 0 and q = 1, shown
as (¡;+).
Figures 6 and 7 provide a precise and complete characterization of equilibrium in
the choice of standards as a function of the size of the big exporters relative to each
0other (±), the size of the competitive fringe of small exporters (L ), and the Northern
demand curve (whether it is logconvex, or logconcave, leading to Figure 6 and Figure 7,
respectively). Consider ¯rst of all the e®ect of varying ± on the nature of the equilibrium.
In Figure 6, as ± increases, the tendency is to move from region G to region H, moving
from (¡;+) through (+;+) or (+;¡) to (+;¡). The same is true in Figure 7. In this
sense, a higher ± makes (+;¡) outcomes \more likely." These observations lead to the
following proposition.
Proposition 5 As one of the big exporters becomes larger relative to the other, the
likelihood of equilibria, in which the larger exporter has high standards and the other
exporter has low standards, increases.
This outcome should not be too surprising since the larger exporter increasingly acts as
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a single exporter and adopts higher standards not only for their direct bene¯t but also
because output restriction is bene¯cial in the face of a downward sloping demand curve.
More generally, since we have already established in Proposition 1 that the smallest
exporters adopt low standards, Proposition 5 strengthens the argument that there should
be positive correlation between market share and standards.
Consider now the impact of the size of the competitive fringe on equilibrium out-
0comes. As discussed earlier, when L increases, the general movement is from region D
to region A, moving from (+;+); through (+;¡) or (¡;+), to (¡;¡). This is the sense
0in which bigger L makes low standards outcome \more likely". The opposite is true in
Figure 7, where the movement is from (¡;¡), through (+;¡) or (¡;+), to (+;+). We
capture these observations in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 As the size of the competitive fringe of small Southern exporters grows,
the likelihood of low standards equilibria increases if Northern demand is logconvex (so
that standards are complements) and decreases if Northern demand is logconcave (so that
standards are substitutes).
That increasing competition from small countries which have low standards and
care only about expanding output may not put downward pressure on the standards of
big exporters is at ¯rst sight a surprising conclusion. But when the role of substitutability
is made clear, it is not surprising at all. What is remarkable is that substitutability is
not a curiosum but the implication of some commonly used demand functions which ¯t
the data (e.g. linear demand). Moreover, the fact that the curvature of the demand
curve plays such a key role highlights the need for parameterising and estimating the
degree of curvature of the demand curves for speci¯c exports of developing countries.
Our analysis so far identi¯es circumstances under which strategic responses to
export competition induce one or both countries to adopt lower standards. It bears
emphasis, however, that a low standard need not imply low welfare, particularly when
terms of trade adjustments and direct utility bene¯ts are small, relative to the increase in
production costs that higher standard necessitates. Accordingly, an equilibrium in which
both countries select low standards need not necessarily imply a coordination failure. We
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turn to this question in the next section, and investigate the potential welfare gains that
can be achieved via South-South cooperation in standards.
5 Welfare and Coordination
In the previous section we have shown that low standards equilibria are not inevitable.
We have provided a precise characterization of circumstances in which high standards
equilibria can arise { for example, combinations of logconvexity of demand and a small
enough competitive fringe, or logconcavity of demand and a large enough competitive
fringe. But low standards equilibria do arise and in such cases an important question
is whether welfare could be improved by both countries adopting high standards and
whether such an outcome could be sustainable. This section considers, therefore, issues
of welfare and coordination in standards.
Let us start by noting that in our model the small exporters always adopt low
standards. If the small exporters as a group were to adopt high standards, they might
bene¯t. But, by assumption, small exporters are too small individually to perceive any
bene¯ts from coordination. Our analysis will therefore focus on coordination between
the big exporters. Su±ce it to say that when the big exporters adopt high standards,
the small exporters bene¯t indirectly through the terms of trade gains.
There are two cases to consider where both of the big exporters do not have high
standards { symmetric equilibria with (¡;¡), and asymmetric equilibria with (+;¡) or
(¡;+). We begin with the symmetric equilibria. The ¯rst question is whether either or
both countries are better o® with a (+;+) outcome than the actual outcome of (¡;¡).
Note from (19) that the gain to each country from both countries going to (+;+), so that
the number of workers in the world under the high standards regime goes from ` = 0 to
` = L, is given by
1 2¢ (0; L) = ¢ (0; L) = ¢(0; L)
+s
= log + (1¡ ®) [log(p(X(L)))¡ log(p(X(0)))] (40)
+Á(s )
In other words, if country 1 is better o® when both countries switch from low to higher
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standards, country 2 must also be better o®, regardless of the distribution of resources
in the two countries. When, if at all, do the two countries bene¯t from coordinating on
high standards? The answer depends on whether standards are substitutes or comple-
i ¡i ¡i iments. Starting with complementarity, and recalling that in this case, ¢ (` ; ` + L )
0is decreasing in L , it follows that
10 · ¢ (0; L)
L L1, 0 · ¢ (0; + ±) if ± = ;
2 2
L L1, 0 · ¢ ( ¡ ±; L) if ± = ;
2 2
L0 0 1 0 1 0 0¹, L · fL j± (L ) = ± (L ) = g ´ L :¡ + 2
¹0L thus denotes the critical level of labor endowment in small countries, such that for
0 0¹all L · L ; country 1 is strictly better o® when both countries switch from low to high
standards. By similar reasoning,
20 · ¢ (0; L)
L0 0 2 0 2 0 0¹, L ¸ fL j± (L ) = ± (L ) = ¡ g ´ L :+ ¡ 2
0 0 0 0 i¹ ¹L divides the (±; L ) space into two regions. For all L ¸ L , ¢ (0; L) · 0, i = 1; 2,
i 0 0¹and ¢ (0; L) > 0 otherwise. L is shown in Figure 8. Thus (±; L ) combinations in all
of region B, C, and I and a subset of region A guarantee welfare improvements for both
countries whenever the two countries move from the low standards equilibria in these
regions to adopt high standards.
Turning now to the case of substitutability, and using reasoning similar to above,
we can de¯ne
L0 0 1 0 1 0L ´ fL j± (L ) = ± (L ) = g;¡ + 2
and,
L0 0 2 0 2 0L ´ fL j± (L ) = ± (L ) = ¡ g:+ ¡ 2
0 0Thus, L divides the (±; L ) space into two regions, and by virtue of strategic substi-
0i 0tutability, ¢ (0; L) < (¸)0 whenever L < (¸)L . The possibility of a welfare gain
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0when both countries switch from low to high standard is therefore assured, whenever L
0 0 0is larger than L . L is shown in Figure 9. Thus (±; L ) combinations in all of region
D guarantee welfare improvements for both countries whenever the two countries move
from the low standards to high standards.
So much for symmetric low standards equilibria (¡;¡). What about asymmetric
equilibria in which one of the two countries has a high standard and the other the low
standard? Can a move from (+;¡) or (¡;+) to (+;+) lead to a welfare improvement?
Clearly, such a move cannot lead to both countries being better o®, since the country
with the low standards in equilibrium prefers low standards when the other country has
high standards. A Pareto improvement is thus ruled out. We can however consider a
general utilitarian welfare function from (11),
X
i iW = V (p; s )
i=1;2
i iX s L
= 2K + log + 2(1¡ ®) log p(X(`)) (41)
iÁ(s )a1i=1;2
Note once again that we are focussing attention on the joint welfare of the two big
exporters { the small exporters will always bene¯t when the two big exporters adopt
successively higher standards.
There are two cases to consider: (¡;+) and (+;¡). The welfare gain in moving
from (¡;+) to (+;+) is given by
++ ++ ¡+¢ = W ¡W¡+ · ¸+s L
= log + 2(1¡ ®) log p(X(L))¡ log p(X( ¡ ±)) : (42)
+Á(s ) 2
Similarly, the welfare gain in moving from (+;¡) to (+;+) is given by
++ ++ +¡¢ = W ¡W+¡ · ¸+s L
= log + 2(1¡ ®) log p(X(L))¡ log p(X( + ±)) : (43)
+Á(s ) 2
0Expressions (42) and (43) can be used to partition the (±; L ) space into regions of welfare
improvement in the two cases. As might be expected, the partitioning is di®erent for the
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cases of complementarity and substitutability. Starting with complementarity, consider
the locus
++ ++ 0¢ = 0, ± = ± (L ): (44)¡+ ¡+
++ ++Above the locus ¢ < 0, and below it ¢ > 0. Comparing (42) with (25), it is clear¡+ ¡+
++ 0 0that with complementarity, the locus ± (L ) will be upward sloping in (±; L ) space and¡+
1lie everywhere above the locus ± . Now consider the locus+
++ ++ 0¢ , ± = ± (L ): (45)+¡ +¡
++ 0Comparing (45) with (27) establishes that ± (L ) will be downward sloping and lie+¡
2 ++ ++everywhere above the locus ± . Above the locus, ¢ < 0, and below it ¢ > 0.+ +¡ +¡
The same analysis can be repeated for substitutability. In this case, the locus
++ 0 1 ++ 0± (L ) will be downward sloping and lies everywhere below the locus ± , while ± (L )¡+ + +¡
2will be upward sloping and lies everywhere below the locus ± . And above the loci there+
is welfare improvement, below them a welfare decrease.
Putting together the analysis for the symmetric and asymmetric case, Figures 8
and 9 provide a complete characterization of when welfare improvement occurs in moving
from (¡;¡), (+;¡) or (¡;+) to the high standards outcome (+;+), respectively for the
0case of complementarity and substitutability. The shaded areas give us (±; L ) combina-
tions where such improvements are possible { note that when the starting equilibrium is
symmetric (¡;¡) the welfare improvement is moreover a Pareto improvement.
0Looking at Figures 8 and 9 the role of L and ± in determining whether a welfare
improvement is possible in moving from low to high standards should be clear. Consider
the regions A, H, G, B, C and I in Figure 8 (the low standards regions under comple-
0mentarity); starting from any point in these regions, for given L , a move of ± closer
to 0 increases (or does not decrease) the likelihood of getting to an area where welfare
improvement is possible as a result of high standard adoption by both countries. The
same is true of regions D, E, F, G, H, B, C and I in Figure 9 (the low standards regions
under substitutability). These observations prompt the following proposition:
Proposition 7 Starting from an equilibrium in which at least one country has low stan-
dards, the joint adoption of high standards is more likely to improve joint welfare the
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more equal the two countries are in size.
Proposition 5 shows that greater disparity in size is more likely to lead to an equilibrium
in which one of the countries has high standards and the other low standards. Proposition
7 argues that greater disparity also makes it more unlikely that adoption of common high
standards leads to a welfare improvement.
0Now consider variations in L . Starting from any point in region A, H, G, B, C,
0or I in Figure 8, a decrease in L which leaves the countries in the same region increases
(or does not decrease) the likelihood of getting into an area where joint high standards
lead to a joint welfare improvement. However, in Figure 9, starting from any point in
0regions D, E, F, G, H, B, C, or I, an increase in L which leaves the countries in the
same region increases (or does not decrease) the likelihood of getting into an area of
joint welfare improvement through joint high standards. These observations lead to the
following proposition:
Proposition 8 Starting from an equilibrium in which at least one country has low stan-
dards, joint adoption of high standards is more likely to lead to a joint improvement of
welfare in the big exporters if (i) the competitive fringe gets a little smaller in the case
of logconvex demand, or (ii) if the competitive fringe gets a little larger in the case of
logconcave demand.
Proposition 8 brings out the interaction between the nature of Northern demand and
the size of Southern small exporters as a group, in determining the bene¯ts from coor-
dination to the big exporters. When the shape of the Northern demand curve makes
Southern standards complements, then a decrease in the relative weight of the small
(low standards) exporters increases the bene¯ts of coordinating on high standards. But
when the shape of the Northern demand curve makes Southern standards substitutes,
the opposite is the case. Once again, this highlights the importance of getting good
empirical estimates of the curvature of the demand curve for speci¯c commodities.
In each of the shaded areas in Figures 8 and 9, the Nash equilibrium outcome is
welfare dominated by a coordinated outcome with high standards in both countries. But
can this coordinated outcome itself be sustained? Clearly, it cannot be sustained as a
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static Nash equilibrium. But it is well-known that coordinated outcomes can sometimes
be sustained in the context of repeated games where deviation from the coordinated
outcome is punished appropriately. We focus on a game structure where if both countries
cooperate and adopt high standards up till time t, each country adopts high standards.
Otherwise, each country adopts the pure Nash equilibrium standard. With multiple pure
strategy equilibria, we allow for any one of the pure strategy equilibria to be chosen. As
always, small exporters stick to low standards.
The discounted welfare of country i over the in¯nite horizon is given by
1X
t ir V :
t=0
where 0 < r < 1 is the common subjective discount factor. We look for the conditions
1 2under which there is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium which supports q = q = 1,
given the static Nash equilibrium choices of standards elaborated in section 4.
Let us start with asymmetric Nash equilibria. Suppose we have (¡;+). Then
deviation from (+;+) by country 1 to the lower standard will certainly increase its
welfare in the period of deviation. By the hypothesis of Nash reversion, in the period
after the deviation, the countries play (¡;+) as strategies, but this is the same as the
outcome in the period of deviation. Country 1 therefore always bene¯ts from deviation
and (+;+) cannot be sustained as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium when (¡;+) is
the asymmetric Nash equilibrium. A similar argument holds for the case when (+;¡) is
a Nash equilibrium. We thus have the following proposition
Proposition 9 When the size of the competitive fringe and the relative sizes of the big
exporters are such as to produce an asymmetric equilibrium in standards, the joint high
standards outcome cannot be sustained as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (under
conventional assumptions) even when it leads to higher joint welfare.
Consider now symmetric equilibria (¡;¡) and the prospects for cooperating to
achieve (+;+). Starting from (+;+) if country i deviates its change in welfare in the
deviation period is simply
i¡¢ ; i = 1; 2+
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that is, minus the gain from adopting the high standard when the other country sticks to
the high standard. In subsequent periods, the loss to the deviating country is the welfare
loss from being at a (¡;¡) rather that a (+;+) outcome. From (40), this is simply
¢(0; L)
for the two countries. Thus country i will not deviate from (+;+) if
ri¡¢ ¡ ¢(0; L) < 0:+ 1¡ r
iUsing the fact, from (25), (27) and (40), that ¢ < ¢(0; L), this can be rewritten as+
i¢+ir > r^ = : (46)
i i¢ ¡¢ (0; L)+
It follows that
1 2r > maxfr^ ; r^ g (47)
ensures that neither country deviates from the (+;+) outcome. Now, notice that at
1 2 1 2± = 0, ¢ = ¢ , and therefore r^ = r^ . A small change in ± starting from zero+ +
1 2introduces a gap between r^ and r^ and therefore reduces the range of r in (47) which
allows the dynamic equilibrium to be sustained. In fact, it can be shown that the gap
1 2between ¢ and ¢ , increases monotonically in ±, so this range of r is reduced as ± goes+ +
further and further away from zero. These observations lead to the following proposition:
Proposition 10 When the size of the competitive fringe and the relative size of the
big exporters are such as to produce a symmetric low standards equilibrium, welfare
improving joint high standards outcome can be sustained as a dynamic equilibrium (under
conventional assumptions) provided that countries are patient enough. As the two big
exporters become more asymmetric in size, the permissible range of patience shrinks,
making it less likely that the joint high standards outcome can be sustained.
Propositions 9 and 10 highlight the damaging impact that size asymmetry between the
two big exporters can have on the possibility of sustaining a high standards outcome.
Starting from equality, and assuming the weight of the competitive fringe to be such
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that there is a symmetric low standards equilibrium, Proposition 10 shows that as the
disparity grows, the range of patience required to sustain the welfare improving high
standards outcome shrinks, making it less likely. Beyond a certain point, the disparity is
so great that there is an asymmetric standards equilibrium. But then, from Proposition
9, the joint high standards outcome is not sustainable at all, even when it would improve
joint welfare.
6 Northern Protectionism and Southern Standards
The question of whether Northern trade protectionism could or should protect Northern
standards is at the heart of the current controversies on globalization. But, whatever its
impact on Northern standards, does Northern protection protect Southern standards, or
does it undermine them? Does it put a °oor under a Southern race to the bottom, or
does it acclerate the race?
The model and analysis developed so far can be put to further work to answer
these questions. Let t be a speci¯c tari® levied by the North on the exports of the South.
¤ ¤Recalling that the Northern inverse import demand function is p(X;R ), where R is the
Northern revenue function, with a speci¯c tari® t the new terms of trade are given by
¤p(X(`); R + tX(`))¡ t
where X(`) is Southern exports as a function of `, the number of Southern workers
under the high standards regime. It is easy to check from (15) that Southern exports
are una®ected by the tari®.
With the tari® in place, the incentives for country i to adopt high standards, the
analogous expression to (19), is now given by
+ hs1 ¡i ¡i i ¡i i ¤ ¡i i¢ (` ; ` + L ; t) = log + (1¡ ®) log(p(X(` + L ); R + tX(` + L ))¡ t)
+Á(s ) i¡i ¤ ¡i¡ log(p(X(` ); R + tX(` ))¡ t) (48)
and thus " #
i ¡i i i ¡i i ¡i@¢ (` ; ` + L ) m(` + L )¡ 1 m(` )¡ 1
= (1¡ ®) ¡ (49)¡i i ¡i@t p(` + L )¡ t p(` )¡ t
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where
@(pX(`))
m(X(`)) = (50)¤@R
is the marginal propensity to import in the North. We make the following standard
assumption.
Assumption 2 The Northern propensity to import as its income increases is less than
one and decreasing in total imports.
iWith this assumption it follows immediately from (49) that @¢ =@t > 0: In other words,
a Northern tari® increases Southern incentives to adopt high standards.
To see the intuition here, note that the marginal export revenue of country i is given
iby p (X(`))X +p(X)¡t, that is, marginal export revenue decreases one-for-one with thex
import tari®. Thus, the extent of export revenue gains that can be achieved by expanding
exports is lower, the higher the import tari®, regardless of whether standards are strategic
complements, or substitutes. In addition, import restrictions also generate an income
e®ect, via the tari® revenue. In particular, the income e®ect reinforces incentives to raise
standards (lower exports), so long as the marginal propensity to consume is decreasing
in total exports.
Since a tari® increases the incentives to adopt high standards, it might be expected
1that the likelihood of low standards equilibria would increase. In Figure 6, the loci ± ,+
1 2 2± , ± and ± all shift upwards. The e®ect on the size of regions G and H (the regions¡ + ¡
of asymmetric equilibria) is ambiguous. Region I contracts but both (+;+) and (¡;¡)
equilibria are possible here. However, regions A, B, and C (low standards) contract and
1 1 2 2regions D, E, and F (high standards) expand. In Figure 7, the loci ± , ± , ± and ±+ ¡ + ¡
all shift downwards. Thus region D in this Figure (the region of low standards in both
countries) contracts and region A (the region of high standards) expands. It is in this
sense, the expansion of (+;+) regions and the contraction of (¡;¡) regions, that an
import tari® makes the emergence of high standards more likely.
Moreover, from (46), Ã !
i i i@¢@r^ 1 @¢ (0; L)+i i= (1¡ r^ ) + r^ < 0 (51)
i i@t ¢ ¡¢ (0; L) @t @t+
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i isince ¢ ¡¢ (0; L) < 0 and+
i i@¢ @¢ (0; L)+ > 0 and > 0
@t @t
from (49) and Assumption 2. In other words, using Proposition 10, a sustainable welfare
improving joint high standards outcome becomes more likely, in the sense that the range
of r for which this occurs is expanded.
It would appear, then, that Northern protectionism aids the emergence of high
standards in the South. However, the implicit assumption in the previous analysis is
that the importing country will not further vary t, once the standard choices of the two
large exporters are made. But this is not entirely credible. We might expect the North
to optimally set its tari® given the outcomes in the South. In particular, consider the
following scenario. The importing and exporting countries play a two-stage game. In
the ¯rst stage, exporting countries compete in setting standards. In the second stage,
the importing country has the liberty to maximize the national welfare by selecting an
optimal import tari®, taking into account Southern choices. What happens in this case?
Beginning with the second-stage, recall from (7) and (5) that aggregate export
supply is a step function, with8> 0 if p < a =a ;1 2<
0X(`) = [0; (1¡ ®)[L + L+ `(1=Á¡ 1)]=a ] if p = a =a (52)1 1 2>: 0(1¡ ®)[L + L+ `(1=Á¡ 1)]=a otherwise.1
Let the optimal import tari® be t(p; `), where p is the market clearing world price
of good 1. Thus, as long as a positive amount of trade takes place between the two
countries, (
0 if p = a =a1 2t(p; `) = (53)
p(`)¡ a =a if p > a =a :1 2 1 2
respectively corresponding to the perfectly elastic and the perfectly inelastic segments
of the export supply curve. It follows, therefore, that the terms of trade that the two
exporting countries can anticipate, given `, is just p(`)¡ t(p; `).
Turning to the ¯rst stage problem of the two large countries, the gain to country
ii (i = 1; 2) from adopting the high standard with probability q is:
i+ i¡EV ¡EV
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+ i ³ ´s L i j j i i= log + (1¡ ®)q q [log[p(L)¡ t(p; L)] + (1¡ q ) log[p(L )¡ t(p; L )]
+Á(s )a1
i ³ ´L i j j j j¡ log ¡ (1¡ ®)(1¡ q ) q log[p(L )¡ t(p; L )] + (1¡ q ) log[p(0)¡ t(p; 0)]
a1
jwhere q is the probability that country j (i6= j) adopts the high standard, and t(p; `)
is the Northern tari®. Using (53), the gain from adopting the high standard becomes
+si+ i¡EV ¡EV = log < 0:
+Á(s )
We therefore have the remarkable result that in this case all incentives to adopt the high
standard are removed. It follows that the only possible equilibria are low standards for
all in the South.
Whether Northern protectionism protects or undermines Southern standards is
5therefore a subtle matter. We summarize our analysis in the following proposition.
Proposition 11 When Southern Standards are set after Northern tari®s are imposed,
Northern protectionism makes high standards equilibria more likely, and coordination
on high standards more likely to be sustainable. But when Northern tari®s are chosen
optimally after Southern standards are set, the choice of these tari®s will be such as to
totally eliminate high standards equilibria in the South.
If Northern tari®s are set optimally in the Northern interest, therefore, they are no friend
of Southern standards. In this case, far from protecting them, Northern protectionism
undermines Southern standards.
7 Conclusion
Let us return to the three questions posed at the start of this paper. Does Chinese trade
competition pose a threat to environmental and labor standards in India, and vice versa?
Propositions 5, 7 and 9 clarify the sense in which this might be the case. The equilibrium
outcome and welfare consequences depend on the size of the exporters relative to each
5It can be shown that the thrust of the proposition holds also for the case of an ad valorem tari®.
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other. Proposition 5 says that as one country becomes relatively big, it is that country
which is more likely to adopt high standards. Proposition 7 tells us that the greater the
disparity in size, the more unlikely it is that the joint adoption of high standards will
lead to an improvement in joint welfare, and Proposition 9 concludes that it is less likely
that the joint high standards outcome can be sustained as a dynamic equilibrium. The
answer to the question depends entirely, therefore, on the relative size of \China and
India". The bigger country will tend to have higher standards, but asymmetry in size is
more likely to lead to outcomes detrimental to joint welfare.
Are standards in India and China pulled down by standards in small countries
such as Myanmar, Honduras or South Africa? Proposition 1 tells us that the competi-
tive fringe of small exporters always adopt low standards. But do these act as a drag on
big exporters' standards? Proposition 6 tells us that the answer depends on very spe-
ci¯c properties of the Northern demand curve. In a general sense, a larger competitive
fringe of small exporters is detrimental to standards of the big exporters if standards
are complements, but it is bene¯cial if they are substitutes. In the speci¯c model, this
depends on whether the Northern demand curve is logconvex or logconcave. More gen-
erally, it depends on the curvature of the demand curve. A larger competitive fringe is
also less likely to lead to situations where joint adoption of high standards by the big
exporters will lead to (i) an increase in joint welfare if demand is logconvex, and (ii) a
decrease in joint welfare if demand is logconcave (Proposition 8). That central properties
on equilibrium outcomes and welfare should depend on such speci¯c properties of the
demand curve is in one sense no surprise. But what this does is to highlight the need for
empirical work on parameterising and estimating the curvature of commodity speci¯c
Northern import demand functions.
Does trade protectionism in the U.S. protect standards in developing countries, or
does it undermine them? Proposition 11 provides a surprisingly sharp, but intuitively
clear, answer to this question. When Southern standards are set after Northern tari®s,
these tari®s aid the adoption of high standards because they reduce the potential revenue
gain to any Southern country from undercutting standards to increase exports. However,
if Northern tari®s are chosen after Southern standards are set, and moreover are chosen
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optimally to advance Northern interests, then the situation is completely reversed { all
incentive to set high standards in the South is creamed o® by the optimal tari®. Since
the North choosing Northern tari®s in the Northern interest is the more likely scenario,
we reach our ¯nal conclusion. Northern protection undermines Southern standards.
The model we have developed is rich enough to allow certain key questions to be
posed, but simple enough to allow speci¯c answers to be given, and intuitions to be
further sharpened. Clearly, the direct applicability of the model is limited by its special
assumptions. But it does suggest areas for empirical research. For example, it calls
for an investigation of the correlation between market share in exports and standards,
the estimation of demand curvature for developing country exports, and the connection
between tari®s in the importing country and standards in the exporting country. Further
research is called for not only in testing the robustness of our theoretical results in more
general models, but also in empirical investigations of export competition and standards
in developing countries.
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Table 1: Labor Intensive Exports and Developing Countries
Country Textiles Country Carpets Country Balls*
US $ mill. US $ mill. US $ mill.
1997 1998 1998
China 4954.14 China 216.70 Pakistan 1754.59
India 3141.01 India 168.76 China 1680.25
Korea, Rep. of 2341.05 Mexico 65.20 Thailand 596.22
Pakistan 2138.06 Israel 62.34 India 348.57
Turkey 1995.85 Egypt 47.27 Indonesia 79.61
Canada 1618.41 Turkey 46.37 Vietnam 66.12
Indonesia 1433.83 Australia 30.54 Mexico 48.42
Mexico 1312.85 Brazil 30.30 Philippines 38.79
Israel 851.57 South Africa 20.22 Dominican Rep. 28.13
Thailand 844.66 Indonesia 19.14 Malaysia 20.17
Czech Rep. 634.57 Morocco 11.89 Brazil 17.85
Iran, Islamic Rep. of 633.94 Thailand 11.07 Morocco 12.35
Egypt 515.34 Hungary 10.14 Panama 11.35
Poland 413.92 Pakistan 8.13 Czech Rep. 11.13
Brazil 359.28 Czech Rep. 6.93 Belarus 10.63
Malaysia 345.99 Saudi Arabia 6.27 Paraguay 6.35
Tunisia 272.73 Poland 5.31 Colombia 5.49
Hungary 232.54 Colombia 4.09 Peru 4.48
Slovak Rep. 198.10 Chile 3.18 Poland 3.93
Slovenia 194.87 Argentina 3.00 Romania 2.96
Bangladesh 184.31 Sri Lanka 2.57 Hungary 2.37
Nepal 170.17 Vietnam 2.50 Saudi Arabia 1.81
Philippines 167.28 Malaysia 2.28 Uruguay 1.77
Sri Lanka 165.75 Russian Fed. 2.11 Estonia 1.74
Romania 131.91 Panama 1.45 Turkey 1.11
Russian Fed. 129.68 Romania 1.41 Argentina 1.05
South Africa 117.16 Estonia 0.81 Sri Lanka 0.94
Estonia 112.85 Venezuela 0.73 Chile 0.83
Morocco 99.32 Philippines 0.63 South Africa 0.70
Lithuania 95.85 Nepal 0.57 Guatemala 0.59
Bulgaria 92.69 Lebanon 0.38 Venezuela 0.56
Viet Nam 84.24 Kazakhstan 0.36 Israel 0.44
United Arab Emirates 67.93 Belize 0.34 Ukrainian 0.42
Australia 59.82 Bangladesh 0.27 Costa Rica 0.23
Croatia 59.19 Slovenia 0.27 Ecuador 0.20
Peru 44.40 Turkmenistan 0.27 Egypt 0.18
Dominican Republic 40.12 Tunisia 0.26 Latvia 0.16
Colombia 36.76 Peru 0.20 Mauritius 0.14
El Salvador 25.82 Ecuador 0.16 Russian Fed 0.12
Costa Rica 19.15 Uruguay 0.14 Honduras 0.12
Guatemala 15.55 Zimbabwe 0.14 Nepal 0.11
Uruguay 7.00 Guatemala 0.13 Jamaica 0.10
*(excl. tennis and golf balls.)
Source: WTO (1998), UNCTAD-TRAINS (Trade Analysis and Information System) (2000).
Table 2. Incentive Patterns and Nash Equilibrium
Under Complementarity
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Note: Rows show country 1 incentives, columns country incentives. Cell labels A to I correspond to 
the regions in Figure 4. The first entry in ( . , . ) refers to country 1’s standard, the second entry 
to country’s standard. A + denotes high standard in equilibrium, a - denotes low standard. Re-
gion I also has a mixed strategy equilibrium, but it is unstable under the standard adjustment
process.
Table 3. Incentive Patterns and Nash Equilibrium
Under Substitutability
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(+, +)
(- , +)
(- , +)
(+, -)
(- , +)
(- , + )
(+, - )
(+ , - )
(- , - )
(+ , - )
Note: Rows show country 1 incentives, columns country incentives. Cell labels A to I correspond to 
the regions in Figure 8. The first entry in ( . , . ) refers to country 1’s standard, the second entry 
to country’s standard. A + denotes high standard in equilibrium, a - denotes low standard. Re-
gion I also has a mixed strategy equilibrium, but it is unstable under the standard adjustment
process.
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Figure 5. Incentives under Substitutability
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Figure 6. Nash Equilibria under Complementarity
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Figure 7. Nash Equilibria under Substitutability
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Figure 8. Areas of Welfare Improvement from Joint
Adoption of High Standards under Complementarity
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Figure 9. Areas of Welfare Improvement From Joint 
Adoption of High Standards under Substitutability
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